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A NEW STANDARD FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED TESTIMONY
State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984)
In State v. Iwakiri,' the Idaho Supreme Court held that hypnotically
refreshed testimony2 is admissible when it appears sufficiently reliable in
light of the totality of the circumstances.3
In Iwakiri's trial for kidnapping, the court admitted testimony of a
witness who twice had undergone hypnosis prior to trial to refresh her
memory of events linking Iwakiri to the crime.4 Iwakiri appealed her
conviction, contending that the trial court erred in admitting hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.5 The Idaho Supreme Court reversed Iwakiri's
conviction on other grounds and remanded the case for new trial.6 The
court went on to hold, however, that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
admissible if the trial court determines at a pretrial hearing that the testi-
mony is sufficiently reliable in view of the totality of the circumstances.7
1. 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984).
2. "Hypnotically refreshed testimony" means the testimony of witnesses who undergo hypno-
sis prior to trial to enhance their memory. This Comment discusses neither the admissibility of the
actual results of a hypnosis session, see, eg., People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 728, 273
N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1978) (inadmissible for purposes of establishing truth of statements made while
under hypnosis or to bolster the credibility of in-court testimony), nor the admissibility of the testi-
mony of a witness in a hypnotic trance, see, eg., Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced
Testimony, 4 OHIo N.U.L Rav. 1, 12 n.41 (1977).
3. 682 P.2d at 578.
4. The witness, Rebecca Boyer, testified that she had seen the missing children in Iwakiri's
home. Id. at 573. Before trial a detective hypnotized Boyer. Id. The detective apparently had
received some formal training in hypnosis, but was not a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. Id. at
590 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Boyer's attorney, another detective, two investigators, an operator, and
a recorder attended the hypnosis session. Id at 573. The police tape-recorded part of the session.
Id. Boyer underwent hypnosis a second time prior to the trial before a Dr. Streib at the Boise
Hypnosis Center. Id. at 573, 594 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 574. Iwakiri also asserted that the trial court erred in admitting testimony as to
conversations between her and her attorney. Id
6. The court ruled that the trial court improperly admitted prejudicial testimony regarding
privileged conversations between Iwakiri and her attorney. Id. See also id. at 580-89 (Bistline, J.,
dissenting).
7. The court remanded the issue concerning the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony to the trial court with directions to resolve it using the newly formulated "totality of the
circumstances" standard. Id. at 574, 578. The court also noted six "safeguards" that it believed the
trial court should consider in applying the test. Id. at 578.
The dissent contended that remanding the hypnosis issue was unnecessary because the record
clearly disclosed that the court's proposed guidelines had not been followed and that the hypnosis
sessions had improperly tainted the witness's memory. Id. at 589-90 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
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Courts traditionally have been reluctant to accept hypnosis8 as a
means of generating admissible evidence.9 Many in the legal community
still oppose the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony because of
the uncertainty surrounding hypnosis and its effects on memory.' 0 Ex-
perts particularly acknowledge problems with the subject's susceptibility
to suggestions from the hypnotist, the subject's inclination to fabricate a
"memory," and the subject's inclination to confabulate (fill in blank spots
in his memory).1"
8. For exhaustive examinations of the theory and history of hypnosis, see K. BOwERs, HYP-
NOSIS FOR THE SERIOUSLY CURIOUS (1976); W. KROGER, CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNO-
sis (2d ed. 1977).
9. See, eg., People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 655, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897) (rejecting testimony
of hypnotist and defendant regarding defendant's statements while under hypnosis and agreeing with
the trial court's statement that "the law of the United States does not recognize hypnotism").
Although hypnotically refreshed testimony has received limited acceptance by the courts, see Com-
ment, People v. Hughes" A Pretrial Procedure for Excluding Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 4
PACE L. REV. 705 (1984), its use by law enforcement bodies in the investigative process has become
widespread. See Monrose, Justice with Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law Enforce-
ment, JURIs. DR. 54 (Oct./N ov. 1978). Police often use hypnosis to elicit information from individ-
uals during investigation. See Brody, Hypnotism v. Crime: A Powerful Weapon or an Abused Tool?,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1980, at Cl, col. 1 (discussing an unreported case where hypnotically-induced
recall of license plate numbers by kidnapping victim led police to perpetrators). The difference be-
tween the use of hypnosis as an investigating tool and as a means of generating testimony is that the
latter establishes truth. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 601 (Idaho 1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
10. Experts disagree about which model most accurately explains how hypnosis affects Inem-
ory. One theory posits that memory works as a videotape and hypnosis merely triggers a replay of
the tape. 682 P.2d at 575. Members of the "investigative hypnosis" school of thought, such as Dr.
Martin Reiser, Director of the Law Enforcement Hypnosis Institute (the leading hypnosis training
center for law enforcement officers), follow the "videotape" theory. Id. at 576. The Supreme Court
of California, in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983), criticized the videotape theory, asserting that the possible effect of
outside influences makes memory "productive rather than reproductive." 31 Cal. 3d 57-62, 641 P.2d
at 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-70.
An alternative contemporary theory refutes the "videotape" theory and suggests that instead of
causing a playback of earlier events, hypnosis creates a state of altered consciousness in which the
subject is "prone to experience distortions of reality, false memories, fantasies and confabulation."
682 P.2d at 575-76 (citing State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 228, 624 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1981)).
11. See, eg., Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Wit-
ness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980). Professor Diamond identifies twelve problems accompanying
hypnosis that may interfere with accurate recall: (1) a hypnotized subject is in a state of heightened
suggestibility; (2) a hypnotist cannot avoid implanting suggestions in a subject's mind; (3) a subject
usually cannot distinguish his own memories from those which are implanted; (4) a subject cannot
restrict his memory to facts free of fabrication and confabulation; (5) the distorting effects of hypno-
sis do not disappear when a subject is awakened from a trance; (6) experts cannot assume that a
subject did not feign hypnosis; (7) neither a hypnotist nor a subject can separate the fact from the
fantasy of a hypnotic recall; (8) the specificity of a subject's recall does not assure accuracy; (9) in-
dependent corroboration of portions of hypnotically refreshed memories does not guarantee the reli-
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In 1968, a Maryland court became the first to admit hypnotically re-
freshed testimony. In Harding v. State, the court held that the use of
hypnosis to refresh a witness's memory raised an issue of credibility
rather than admissibility.12 Although the court did not elaborate upon
its innovative position,13 Harding sparked a trend favoring the admission
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 4 Recently, however, courts have
split into three camps regarding the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony.
Ten states currently follow Harding and hold that hypnotically re-
freshed testimony raises a question of credibility rather than admissibil-
ity."5 These courts prefer to accept the inherent risks of hypnosis rather
than exclude relevant evidence.
ability of the remainder; (10) it is impossible to make a complete record of a hypnotic experience;
(11) hypnosis can resolve a subject's doubts and artificially improve a subject's posthypnotic de-
meanor and self-confidence; and (12) experts who can reliably testify to the recall of a hypnotized
witness are rare. Id. at 332-42.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has summarized the unreliability of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony under the following headings: suggestion, confabulation, incorrect recall, purposeful lying,
undue weight given by jury, hypnotic inducement not scientifically reliable, and safeguards cannot
insure posthypnotic testimony is reliable. State ex rel, Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 183-
87, 644 P.2d 1266, 1269-73 (1982).
12. 5 Md. App. 230, 234, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). The
Maryland Court of Appeals overruled Harding fourteen years later in State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670,
464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
13. The Harding court relied heavily upon the declaration of the witness, a rape victim, that she
was testifying from her own recollection in trying to identify her attacker. 5 Md. App. at 234, 246
A.2d at 306. The court reasoned that the witness's achievement of present knowledge after hypnosis
was relevant only to the weight of her testimony. Id.
14. See, eg., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205
S.E.2d 240 (1974); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1974); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or.
App. 1,492 P.2d 312 (1971). See generally Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-
Is it Competent?, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 155, 169 (1983).
Many of the early cases following Harding did not address the possibility that hypnosis may
distort memory. The courts instead chose to rely upon the witnesses' assertions that they testified
from their own recollection and the assumption that cross-examination would reveal any credibility
problems. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 602 (Idaho 1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 228-30, 624 P.2d 1274, 1276-78 (1981)). Some courts continue to adhere to the
Harding approach. See cases cited infra note 15.
15. State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Cohoon, 120
I11. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (1983); State v. Moore, 432 So. 2d 209 (La.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
435 (1983); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138
(N.D. 1983); State v. Brown, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). But see Brown v. State, 426
So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (using conditional admissibility).
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Thirteen states currently hold hypnotically refreshed testimony inad-
missible per se.1 6  Courts in these states, applying the rule of Frye v.
United States, 7 find that the scientific community has not accepted hyp-
nosis as a reliable method of restoring memory. 8 These courts hold hyp-
notically enhanced testimony fatally unreliable because of the lack of
procedures to thwart fabrication and confabulation. 9 A slight majority
of these courts, however, permits a witness who has undergone hypnosis
to testify to matters recalled prior to hypnosis.2"
Finally, seven states condition the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony upon adherence to procedures that make the testimony
more reliable.2 These courts recognize the inherent risks of hypnotically
enhanced testimony,22 but believe that compliance with procedural safe-
guards minimizes the dangers23 and justifies admission of the testi-
16. State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983);
People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind.
1983); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 338 Mass.
519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzalez, 413 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v.
Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981);
People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. 1983); State v. Peoples,
319 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981);
Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye conditions the admissibility of evidence based on scien-
tific methods of proof upon a showing that the scientific community generally accepts the method in
question. rd. at 1014.
18. See, eg., People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484,466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. 1983).
19. Id. See also supra note 11 (noting problems of hypnosis).
20. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v.
Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Jackson, 144 Mich. App. 649, 319 N.W.2d
613 (1982); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982); State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 331
N.W.2d 500 (1983); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y.
1983); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982).
21. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas); State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d
420 (Iowa 1983); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d
86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d
1040 (1982); State v. Martin, 33 Wash. App. 486, 656 P.2d 526 (1982); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.
2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983). See also Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(conditional approach). But see Crum v. State, 433 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per se
admissible approach).
22. See supra note 11 (noting problems of hypnosis).
23. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The court maintained that proce-
dural requirements help produce an adequate record for evaluating the reliability of the hypnotic
session, see infra note 27 and accompanying text, and ensure a minimum level of reliability. 86 N.J.
at 535, 432 A.2d at 96.
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mony.24 Before determining whether a hypnotic session complied with
the required safeguards, however, these courts will make a preliminary
evaluation of the reliability of the hypnosis in restoring memory by con-
sidering the type and extent of memory loss involved and the witness's
possible motives for not remembering.2 5 After this threshold inquiry,
these courts determine whether the proffering party complied with re-
quired safeguards 26 and whether the procedures followed sufficiently as-
sured reliability to support admission of the hypnotically refreshed
testimony.27
In State v. Iwakiri, the Supreme Court of Idaho departed from the
24. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Hurd held that hypnosis met the
Frye test in the limited sense that experts recognize it as capable of yielding recollections as accurate
as those of ordinary witnesses, who are often historically inaccurate. 86 N.J. at 531, 533-34, 432
A.2d at 92, 94-95. The court did not require hypnosis to be generally accepted as a means of reviv-
ing truthful recall because the purpose of hypnosis is not to obtain truth, but to restore memory. Id.
at 531, 432 A.2d at 92. The court contended that because the adversary system would ferret out any
weaknesses in hypnotically refreshed testimony, there was no need to "recognize historical accuracy
as a condition for admitting eyewitness testimony." Id. at 534, 432 A.2d at 95.
25. See e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 544-45, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96 (1981).
26. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The Hurd court adopted six
procedural safeguards developed by Dr. Martin Orne, an expert in hypnotically induced testimony,
that are designed to ensure a minimum level of reliability: (1) to elicit the most accurate recall
possible, the hypnotist must be a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis and
should qualify as an expert to assist the coart later, (2) the hypnotist should be independent of the
parties to the action and any interested third parties, such as the police, so that bias is not translated
into hypnotic suggestion; (3) there must be a record of information given to the hypnotist before the
hypnosis session, so the court can determine whether the hypnotist could have communicated infor-
mation to the witness either directly or through suggestion; (4) carefully refraining from influencing
the description or adding new details, the hypnotist should take a detailed statement of facts from
the subject before hypnosis by asking standardized questions, so the court can compare pre- and
posthypnotic testimony; (5) there must be a record, preferably on videotape, of all contact between
the hypnotist and the subject, again to enable the court to determine the risk of suggestion; and
(6) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session,
including the prehypnotic testing and the posthypnotic interview, so as to avoid inadvertent influ-
ence. 86 N.J. at 544-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
Some courts add additional requirements, such as testing of witnesses prior to hypnosis for possi-
ble mental illness and competency, and requiring that consideration be given to evidence that cor-
roborates or contradicts information elicited during hypnosis. See, eg., People v. Lewis, 103 Misc.
2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1980). See also State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 577 n.3 (Idaho 1984).
27. See, eg., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981). Factors meriting consid-
eration include: (1) the manner of questioning and the presence of cues or suggestions during and
after the hypnotic session, (2) whether the subject initially "relived" the events without much ques-
tioning by the hypnotist, and (3) the amenability of the subject to hypnosis. "None of these factors
should be considered absolute prerequisites to admissibility, nor are they exclusive. They. . . illus-
trate the nature of the inquiry." 86 N.J. at 535, 432 A.2d at 96.
The party attempting to introduce the testimony bears the burden of proof throughout the in-
quiry. See, e.g., id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 97.
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three existing standards of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, and adopted a "totality of the circumstances" rule.28 By modify-
ing the conditional admissibility approach, the court intended to resolve
the problems that it saw in the three approaches.29
The Iwakiri court began by considering the evolution of the law of
witness competence.30 The court found that the current trend of the law
rejects per se rules of witness incompetence as unnecessarily extreme lim-
itations upon the fact-finder. 31  After identifying several commonly rec-
ognized problems associated with hypnotically refreshed testimony,3 2 the
court concluded that none of the three modem approaches to the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony adequately addressed these
problems.33
The Iwakiri court criticized those courts advocating a per se rule of
admissibility and argued that cross-examination and impeachment would
not always provide sufficient protection against unreliable hypnotic
methods.34 The court noted that per se inadmissibility, in contrast,
would sometimes exclude reliable testimony.35 Finally, the court criti-
cized the conditional admissibility approach for using a strict procedural
format as a proxy for reliability.3 6
28. 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984).
29. 682 P.2d at 577-78. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text (discussing the three
modem approaches).
30. Id. at 575. The court noted that while at early common law certain types of witnesses were
considered incompetent per se, the rigid rules had evolved "into a general rule of competency, giving
to the jury the duty of judging the credibility of witnesses." Id.
31. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 601).
32. Id. at 575-76. The court first noted the uncertainty regarding how hypnosis and memory
work. See supra note 10. The Iwakiri court did not adopt a theory as to the functioning and interre-
lationship of hypnosis and memory. The court also noted the possibility that a hypnotized subject
might receive suggestions, confabulate, or believe that distortions in memory due to suggestions or
confabulations are actually a part of their memory. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
33. 682 P.2d at 576-78. The court found that each approach advocates a type of per se rule
inconsistent with the trend towards presuming every person to be a competent witness. Each of the
three approaches focuses upon one aspect of competency rather than allowing the trial court to look
to all relevant factors. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
34. 682 P.2d at 577. A per se admissibility standard, therefore, sometimes would allow the
admission of unreliable testimony.
35. Id.
36. "We foresee circumstances where, even when the safeguards are not strictly or entirely
followed, a trial court could nevertheless conclude that the testimony would still be sufficiently relia-
ble for its admission." Id. at 577-78. As an example, the court indicated that the presence of per-
sons other than the hypnotist and the subject at the session, see supra note 26, would not necessarily
render the testimony unreliable. Id. at 578.
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For these reasons, the court rejected the three approaches and adopted
a "totality of the circumstances" test that requires trial courts to conduct
pretrial hearings regarding the hypnotic procedures used in each case.37
At the pretrial hearing, the judge must determine whether, in view of the
totality of the circumstances, the proffered hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.38
To guide trial judges in applying the "totality of the circumstances"
test, the Iwakiri court adopted a modified version of the procedural safe-
guards required by courts adhering to the conditional admissibility ap-
proach.39 Although these guidelines are not solely determinative of the
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, the court cautioned
that admission of such evidence would be unusual if none of the sug-
37. Id.
38. Id. The court believed it best to have the trial court determine reliability prior to submission
of the evidence to the jury, as it does when faced with similar evidentiary problems such as eyewit-
ness testimony. Id. at 578-79. The "totality of the circumstances" rule applies regardless of whether
the plaintiff or the defendant produces the witness. Id at 578. See also id. at 606 (Bistline, J.,
dissenting) (discussing an inconsistent line of cases that allowed prosecutors, but not defendants, to
introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony).
If hypnotically refreshed testimony fails to satisfy the "totality of the circumstances" test, the trial
court may still allow the witness to testify on matters upon which hypnosis has not tainted his
memory. Id. at 579. The court did not decide whether such permissible testimony should be limited
to situations where parts of the witness's memory clearly existed prior to hypnosis. Compare id with
supra note 20 and accompanying text (cases permitting testimony to matters recalled prior to hypno-
sis). The court did suggest, however, that the trial court examine statements made by witnesses prior
to hypnosis, as well as records of the session, to determine whether certain areas were not covered.
Id. at 578.
39. Id.
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist
trained in the use of hypnosis and thus aware of its possible effects on memory, so as to aid in
the prevention of cueing and improper suggestion.
(2) The person conducting the session should be independentfrom either of the parties in
the case.
(3) Information given to the hypnotist by either party concerning the case should be noted,
preferably in written form, so that the extent of information the subject received from the
hypnotist may be determined.
(4) Before hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain a detailed description of the facts from
the subject, avoiding adding new elements to the subject's description.
(5) The session should be recorded so a permanent record is available to ensure against
suggestive procedures. Videotape is a preferable method of recordation, but not mandatory.
(6) Preferably, only the hypnotist and subject should be present during any phase of the
hypnotic session, but other persons should be allowed to attend if their attendance can be
shown to be essential and steps are taken to prevent their influencing the results of the session
(4e., they are not allowed to participate in the session, etc).
Id. (emphasis added to indicate modifications). Compare Iwakiri's procedural safeguards, supra,
with those proposed by Dr. Orne and used by courts following the conditional admissibility ap-
proach, supra note 26.
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gested safeguards were followed.' It would also be unusual, the court
noted, for a trial court to exclude testimony upon a showing of full com-
pliance with the suggested procedures.41
If the trial court finds the witness competent, the witness may testify.
The Iwakiri court, however, indicated that the witness could not testify
to the fact of hypnosis. The cross-examining party can impeach on the
basis of hypnosis or inconsistent prehypnosis statements. If such im-
peachment occurs, both parties may introduce expert testimony regard-
ing hypnosis.42
In dissent, Judge Bistline criticized the majority's holding on two
grounds. First, Judge Bistline found fault with the majority's refusal to
apply its new rule to the case at bar.43 He believed that the defendant had
convincingly established that prior hypnosis had tainted the witness's
memory.' Second, he criticized the majority for adopting a rule under
which hypnotically refreshed testimony might be admissible45 and as-
serted that hypnotically refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible."
The Iwakiri court properly rejected existing standards of admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The Iwakiri approach creates a pre-
40. Id. at 579.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 579-80. The court was concerned that a witness might buttress his testimony by
stating that his present memory resulted from hypnosis, a testimonial practice forbidden in the con-
text oflie detectors. Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). See also People
v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978) (defendant cannot inform jury that his
memory was restored by hypnosis).
43. 682 P.2d at 589-98 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 589-90, 598 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Judge Bistline identified several fatal shortcom-
ings in the procedures surrounding the hypnosis. The detective conducting the first session was not a
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. Id. at 590. It was unclear whether Boyer had reported seeing
the children in Iwakiri's home before she submitted to hypnosis. Id. People other than the hypno-
tist and the subject were present during the session. Id. at 590-91. The responses given by the
hypnotist to the subject may have tainted her memory. Id. at 591. The record of the first session
was of poor quality. Id. at 594 (summarizing the testimony of one of Iwakiri's expert witnesses).
The depth of the hypnotic trance was disputed. Id. at 594-96 (summarizing the testimony of both of
Iwakiri's expert witnesses).
45. Id. at 598-606 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Judge Bistline argued that (1) the case at bar was an
inappropriate vehicle for formulating a new rule, (2) overwhelming authority indicated that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony is unreliable, and (3) the state of the science of hypnosis is not sufficiently
advanced to support a rule of admissibility. Id. at 598. In reference to the third point, Bistline
chiefly relied upon the opinion of Idaho's solicitor general as expressed in a brief in a case contempo-
raneous to Iwakiri. At oral argument, the solicitor general stated: "I'm suggesting to you that the
empirical evidence about the effect of hypnosis on witnesses is sufficiently incomplete that neither the
state nor the Court should take a position on that aspect of it at this juncture." Id. at 601.
46. Id. at 601-06 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
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sumption of witness competence and retains some flexibility in determin-
ing admissibility.47 Although significant costs in the form of increased
expense, complexity, and duration of trial accompany a flexible approach
to the question of admissibility, these costs are clearly less than those
resulting from rigid per se rules.48
Although the Iwakiri court employed sound logic in reaching its deci-
sion, it might have articulated its theory more cogently. The persuasive-
ness of Iwakiri hinges upon the acceptability of the court's assumption
that hypnotically refreshed testimony can be reliable in at least some cir-
cumstances. Rather than directly addressing the question of whether
hypnosis lacks sufficient scientific acceptance to support judicial ap-
proval,49 the court simply relied upon the modem presumption of wit-
ness competence.50
The court overlooked several responsive arguments. First, the court
could have adopted the videotape model of hypnosis,51 thereby prevent-
ing challenges based on reliability. Such a position, however, arguably
lacks convincing scientific backing52 and would be subject to challenges
based upon increased understanding of hypnosis.5 3 Second, the court
could have argued that the scientific community has generally accepted
hypnosis as a reasonably reliable method of restoring memory, subject to
the inaccuracies common to all human recollection. 4 Such a position
finds support in both the per se" and the conditional56 admissibility
camps and is consistent with a preference for allowing witnesses of vary-
47. Accord FED. R. EvID. 601 (presumption of witness competency).
48. Per se inadmissibility rules may exclude reliable and relevant evidence and they run con-
trary to the general presumption of witness competence. See supra notes 35 & 47 and accompanying
text. Per se admissibility rules may permit admission of unreliable evidence and they create a condi-
tion more consistent with an irrebutable presumption than with the simple presumption currently
favored. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Finally, strict procedural requirements lack the
flexibility preferred by modern courts. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (the inadmissible per se approach) & note 45
and accompanying text (the Iwakiri dissent).
50. See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 10.
52. See supra note 10 (comparing the competing understandings of hypnosis).
53. See, eg., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
54. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); see also supra notes 21-27 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the theory that hypnotically refreshed testimony is beneficial within the limits
imposed by its inherent risks of inaccuracy).
55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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ing degrees of reliability to testify subject to credibility challenges.57 By
supporting its underlying assumption with either of the above-noted ar-
guments, the court could have strengthened the persuasive force of its
opinion.
The court's failure to elaborate upon the differences between its "total-
ity of the circumstances" approach and the conditional admissibility ap-
proach further dilutes Iwakiri's persuasiveness. Iwakiri inaccurately
contends that the conditional admissibility approach merely uses compli-
ance with procedural requirements as a proxy for reliability.58 While
failure to comply with procedures bars admission of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony under the conditional approach, compliance does not
guarantee admission.59 Instead, a further analysis of reliability, analo-
gous to a review of the "totality of the circumstances," follows a finding
of procedural compliance.' Hence, the Iwakiri standard and conditional
admissibility differ only as to the significance attributed to procedures. 61
Finally, unlike some conditional admissibility decisions,62 Iwakiri does
not explain what factors amidst the "totality of the circumstances," aside
from suggested procedures, support a finding of reliability.63 Without
such guidance, lower courts are likely to place greater reliance upon pro-
cedures than the Iwakiri court desires and perhaps even more so than
they would if applying the conditional admissibility approach.
Despite its shortcomings, Iwakiri makes possible an increased flexibil-
ity in the determination of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. If realized, this potential will enhance the fact-finding process by
increasing the amount of potentially valuable evidence that may be ad-
mitted. Widespread realization, however, depends upon a future elabo-
57. See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. "Conditional admissibility" courts demand complete satisfaction of procedural prerequi-
sites, without exception. See supra notes 21 & 26 and accompanying text. Contrariwise, Iwakiri
incorporates procedural compliance into its "totality of the circumstances" analysis, commenting
that full compliance would normally lead to admission, whereas complete failure to comply would
normally lead to exclusion. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text. The Iwakiri court
suggested that a trial judge nevertheless might exercise his discretion to admit the evidence even if all
the safeguards are not met. 682 P.2d at 579.
62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ration of the components of the "totality of the circumstances" standard
that support courts' underlying preferences for admitting testimony.
R.G.O.
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